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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15714 
BERNARD SANDOVAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
JAYE. BANKS, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 F ~ l ED 
RICHARD G. MacDOUGALL 
321 South Sixth East 
[\ !\\! 1. 1. 1978 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 ----~------------
C!.:.-~ ~·.J-:r::.'":"'"' C-::·_·-t I ! ' ~I, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pl a inti ff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 
15714 
BERNARD SANDOVAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S FEDERAL AUTHORITY IS FACTUALLY 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM APPELLANT'S AUTHORITY 
AND THE CASE AT BAR 
In its brief, respondent relies on a line of authority 
distinguishing one of appellant's principal cases, De Luna v •. United 
States, 308 F .2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearing denied 324 F.2d 375 
(1963). Respondent cites United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607 (7th 
Cir. 1969) and United States v. Alpem, 564 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1977). 
In Hutul, supra, counsel for Hutul stated in his closing 
argument to the jury that his client was the only one to take the stand and 
that he had testified in good faith. His comments were not specifically 
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directed at any one of the remaining co-defendants. 
follows: 
The court in Hutul commented on th is distinction as 
The nature of the prejudicial comments in 
De Luna differ significantly from the statements 
in the instant case. Hutul's attorney's comments 
were part of his defense that he acted in good 
faith and that there was no direct, but only 
circumstantial evidence of his participation in 
the fraudulent scheme. In presenting such defense 
Hutul took the stand to explain his actions. Vlewe; i 
in the context of the argument to the jury, then, I 
the comments which defendants seek to isolate I 
are seen to not be directed negatively to the other 
defendants' failure to testify, but rather positively 
to Hutul's good faith defense, a defense not offered 
by any other defendant. 416 F.2 at621. 
Similarly, in Alpern, supra, the comments by counsel 
for one of the co-defendants were not directed specifically at any ooe 
co-defendant. Conversely, in the case at bar, the comments by counsel I 
for Morishita during his opening statement clearly were directed towara I 
appellant Sandoval to the point of attempting to state to the jury the 
content of the allegedly exculpatory testimony that Sandoval would be 
liekly to relate were he to take the stand. After objection by counsel 
for appellant, instructions by the court to counsel for Morishita not to 
call Sandoval, and cautionary instructions to the jury, counsel for 
Morishita proceeded in open court before the jury to call Sandoval as 
his first witness. 
-2- j 
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h 
Following is a portion of the record concerning this 
sequence of events: 
THE COURT: You may make your record, Mr. 
Mccaughey. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, at this time I would 
like to put on the record at least what my version of 
what happened on February 3rd--excuse me--January 
13th at the conference that we had at the bench with 
your Honor. 
It is my recollection that Mr. Rich had just--was in 
the process of giving his opening statement after the 
State had rested, and during that opening statement 
Mr. Rich made the statement to the jury that he in-
tended to call Co-defendant Bernard Sandoval to the 
stand. And Mr. Rich began telling the jury what Mr. 
Sandoval would say, at which time I objected. 
THE COURT: He didn't get anything out. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: He did not get anything. That's 
right. He began, but he did not get anything. At that 
time I objected. The Court sustained my objection and 
admonished the jury to disregard what Mr. Rich said, 
that he could not call the Co-defendant to the stand. At 
that time, we had a conference at the side bar wherein 
Mr. Rich proffered to your Honor that Mr. Sandoval 
would make various statements exculpating the other 
two Defendants, at which time your Honor ruled that 
both Mr. Sand--excuse me, that Co-Defendant, Mr. 
Sandoval, could not testify as to what Mr. Rich had 
proffered at that time because of the attomey-cl ient 
relationship. And the Court further ruled that he could 
not call him to the stand. 
THE COURT: That was based on the representations 
of what the evidence would be. 
-3-
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MR. McCAUGHEY: That's correct. And the Court 
at that time gave Mr, Rich the opportunity, or told 
him that he would have the opportunity at a later tin;, 
to proffer on the record what Mr. Sandoval would 
testify to, which later occurred, which Mr. Rich did 
that, and the Court upheld the same ruling that it 
had been issued at the side bar conference. A~er th, I 
conference, Mr. Rich completed his opening statem~· 
and retumed to the counsel table, at which time hew:: 
directed to call his first witness. 
At that time he called the Co-defendant--in front of I 
the jury called the Co-defendant, Mr. Sandoval, to~ 
stand, at which time I objected and made a motion, 
which I asked the Court permission to argue outside 
the presence of the jury. That request was granted, 
and we later argued the motion either for a mistrial, 
or, in the alternative, for a severance. And the cou~ 1 
eventually denied that motion. 
THE COURT: I think that it should also reflect that)':. 
affirmatively said that he WOJ ldn't take the stand. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's correct. The point Mr. 
Rich was giving in his opening statement, I had restec 
my case and indicated I would put on no evidence. 
That was the posture of the action when Mr. Rich ma(); 
his statement. I think, to the best of my recollectioo, 
that's what happened at side bar and what ocOJrred 
during the trial. 
THE COURT: That's the Court's recollection too. 
(REC. pages 437 to 438). 
i 
It is apparent that the remarks by counsel for Morishita 
were clearly and specifically directed solely at Co-defendant Sandoval 
and focused the attention of the jury upon Sandoval's refusal to take the 
stand. 
-4-
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Further, respondent cites no case in support of its position 
wherein an attorney actually, in open court, attempts to call a Co-defendant 
to the stand when such Co-defendant is unwilling to testify. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S UTAH AUTHORITY IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM THE CASE AT BAR 
While conceding that the standard for errors affecting 
fundamental constitutional rights is that such error must be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, respondent proceeds to cite the harmless error 
rule as stated in Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), which has 
no applicability to the case at bar. Further, respondent cites no Utah case 
conceming an attempt to call an unwilling defendant to the stand in open 
court before a jury. 
In fact, State v. Lybert, 30 Utah 2d 180, 515 P.2d 441 (1973), 
relied upcn by respondent, rt;Jles favorably for appellant on the issue of 
an accused's right to call an unwilling Co-defendant to the stand. In Lybert, 
supra, appellant contended that the trial court committed prejudicial error 
by refusing to allow him to call his Co-defendant as a witness in the presence 
of the jury, The Supreme Court of Utah, recognizing the potential for 
prejudicial error, stated concerning appellant's claim: 
As to the defendant's second claimed error, he contends 
that the Court's refusal to permit him to call the 
-5-
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Co-defendant as a witness in the presence of the ju~· 
deprived him of his right to compulsory attendance ~f 
witnesses. The defendant further claimed ti-et even 
though the co-defendant outside of the presence of the 
jury had claimed his privilege to remain silent, never· 
the less he was entitled to have such inferences as ma·. 
arise in the minds of the j;; ry from the cal ling of the 
witness and his claiming the privilege. Under the fa~: 
of this case and the two defendants having each decline 
to testify, we must conclude there is no merit in this 
contention. 51 5 P. 2d at 442. 
Respondent's brief fails to deal directly with the fact that 
counsel for appellant made his motion to sever alternatively with a mt• 
for mistrial. Consequently, the trial court had before it the altematl.; 
of granting a mistrial should it determine that the facts involved herer 
were not sifficient to warrant a severance. Surely, the presumption 
of prejudice as to Sandoval arising from the conduct of counsel for 
Morishita justified, at the least, the granting of a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing and appellant's original brie' 
I 
in this case, appellant respectfully urges this Court to grant a reversa 
of his conviction. 
DATED this I 'J,-Jl,day of November, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
1 hereby certify I delivered 2 copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this !L/Jl. day of November, 1978. 
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